THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW
2nd Edition, by Thomas Miceli
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW
2nd Edition, by Thomas Miceli
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW
2nd Edition, by Thomas Miceli
  

Chapter 8

1. Consider a 100% contingency contract between a client and a lawyer whereby the lawyer pays the client a fixed amount up front and then the lawyer retains the full amount of whatever recovery the case yields in a settlement or trial. What are the incentive and risk-sharing aspects of this contract? Can you think of any arguments for why such an arrangement should not be allowed?

2. Discuss the problem of court delay in a supply-demand framework. Does it reflect an excess supply or demand? How should the cost of filing a lawsuit be adjusted to eliminate the delay? Can you think of a reason why this might not be a good policy? (Hint: Think of the rationale for laws against ticket scalping.)